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ENHANCING DEMOCRACY THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 
ANDREW GELMAN University of California, Berkeley 
GARY KING Haward  University 
e  demonstrate  the surprising  benefits  of  legislative  redistricting  (including partisan 
gerrymandering) for  American  representative  democracy.  In  so  doing,  our  analysis 
resolves  two long-standing  controversies  in American  politics.  First,  whereas  some  w 
scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting  incumbents, others, 
that the relationship is spurious,  we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases 
responsiveness.  Second,  while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases 
partisan  bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering 
biases electoral systems in  favor of  the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would 
have happened if  the other party  controlled it, but any type of  redistricting reduces partisan  bias as 
compared  to an  electoral  system  without  redistricting.  Incorrect  conclusions  in both  literatures 
resulted from  misjudging the enormous uncertainties present  during redistricting periods,  making 
simplified  assumptions about the redistricters'  goals, and  using inferior statistical  methods. 
I 
n 1982, the Michigan Supreme Court imposed a 
redistricting plan on their state that was generally 
believed to favor the Republicans. The Democrats' 
alternative measure had to pass the legislature with a 
two-thirds vote, which was difficult even though they 
had a majority in both houses.  Democratic leaders 
tried to sneak through the legislation by gutting the 
contents, but not the title, of  an irrelevant bill at the 
last minute and inserting redistricting legislation. The 
Republicans discovered this ploy,  making the situa- 
tion extremely tense. In the heat of  the long debate 
during this midnight session, a Democratic senator 
collapsed. Paramedics were called in, but he refused 
to leave the Senate floor before the vote. In a classic 
case of  political hardball,  a Republican senator used 
parliamentary procedure to delay the vote by insist- 
ing that  the legal description of  all  148 legislative 
districts and their boundaries be read into the record. 
Despite his  failing health,  the  Democratic senator 
stayed through the entire reading, and his party won 
the vote.' 
During the Illinois redistricting process, 
Republican state Senator Mark Rhoads believed he had 
the Democratic votes needed to pass a GOP map in the 
Senate.  In  a  rare  Sunday  legislative  session  Rhoads 
became  outraged  over  the  parliamentary  tactics  em- 
ployed by [Senator] Rock to delay a vote on reapportion- 
ment. Unable to control his anger, Rhoads attempted to 
charge the podium and get at Rock. However, before he 
reached the burly Senate president,  Democratic down- 
state Senator Sam Vadalabene sucker-punched Rhoads 
with  a  right  to  the  jaw.  According  to  eyewitness A1 
Manning of  the State Journal Register,  "for  a moment it 
looked as though both benches were going to empty," 
but,  with the television cameras grinding,  the combat- 
ants were pulled apart. Later in the day, Rock eventually 
called  the  remap bill  and with  total  party  unity  the 
Democrats passed  out their  own bill,  thus assuring a 
reapportionment deadlock. (Green 1982, 32) 
These are among the most colorful recent redistrict- 
ing stories, but they accurately portray the intensity 
of  the  partisan  conflict  in  many  such  processes 
throughout the United States. From George Wash- 
ington's  first presidential veto  to  the present  day, 
redistricting issues have been extremely controversial 
at every level of  government. Most redistrictings are 
contested in state and federal court cases heard  so 
late that there is insufficient time to follow the usual 
rules of  discovery, evidence, or due process. In total, 
legislative redistricting is one of  the most conflictual 
forms of  regular politics in the United States short of 
violence. 
While  partisan  and bipartisan redistricting plans 
can protect incumbents,  they only protect some of 
those  who  survive  the  redistricting  process-and 
many do not survive. Indeed, most incumbent poli- 
ticians would give an awful lot to avoid redistricting 
altogether. After all,  they are fighting over the fun- 
damental rules of  the game (fights that might well 
have been concluded at the founding of  the republic) 
and  for  their  own  political  survival.  As  a  result, 
redistricting creates enormous levels of  uncertainty, 
an  extremely  undesirable  situation  for  any  sitting 
politician. Indeed, because the costs of  the political 
fight frequently outweigh the benefits of  government 
service during redistricting, incumbents  dispropor- 
tionately choose to retire at this time.' 
Some scholars assume  that those  who draw the 
district lines are motivated by incumbent protection, 
whereas  others  believe  the  motivation  is  partisan 
advantage,  but  even  the  briefest  discussion  with 
participants in the process indicates that redistricters 
are  concerned with  both.  Indeed,  these  are  often 
competing goals: incumbents are often forced to give 
up votes (hence electoral safety) in order to increase 
the number of  legislative seats their party is likely to 
capture. The tension between the goals of  individual 
and partisan advantage creates yet additional uncer- Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
tainty  about  the  outcome  of  a  redistricting.  Since 
political party gain is the most predictable common 
ground for otherwise competing incumbents,  party 
advantage will often take precedence over individual 
incumbents' advantage in the ultimate political com- 
promise represented by a redistricting plan. 
Moreover,  not  only  do  redistricters  attempt  to 
maximize the competing goals of  incumbency protec- 
tion and partisan advantage, but incumbency protec- 
tion is itself  composed of  competing goals: winning 
the  general election and winning (or avoiding) the 
primary election. These goals conflict because adding 
too many of  a legislator's political party members to 
his or her district (hence piling up expected votes in 
the general election) might leave the incumbent vul- 
nerable to a now larger opposition faction within his 
or her party primary.3 
In addition to the high levels of  political conflict 
and uncertainty  and the  conflicting goals of  those 
who  draw the district lines,  the  entire  process in- 
cludes several severe legal and political constraints. 
These include the requirements of  equal population, 
contiguity,  compactness,  minority  representation, 
maintaining  communities  of  interest,  not  splitting 
local  subdivisions,  and  especially  protecting  some 
incumbents,  all  within  the  context of  complicated 
local  geography.  Other  constraints  are  much  less 
widely recognized but no less important to incum- 
bents,  such  as  the  inclusion  of  the  right  political 
contributors, the exclusion of  prospective challeng- 
ers,  and the  keeping  of  each  favored incumbent's 
several district offices within the di~trict.~ 
Thus, in our view,  the key to understanding the 
effects of  redistricting is to view redistricters as trying 
to achieve consensus among--or  impose a solution 
on-incumbents  who are operating in an extremely 
uncertain environment and attempting to reconcile at 
least three competing goals: to maximize their prob- 
ability of  winning or avoiding a party primary, to win 
a general election (conditional on winning the prima- 
ry), and to increase their political party's seat advan- 
tage.  The  resulting  redistricting  plan  is  usually  a 
compromise, heavily influenced by numerous formal 
and informal constraints,  which  generally weights 
the  political  party's  overall  seat  advantage  most 
hea~ily.~ 
We shall evaluate, and then resolve, two important 
scholarly disagreements about the effects of  legisla- 
tive redistricting on two features of  American demo- 
cratic  electoral  systems: electoral  responsiveness  and 
partisan bias.  Both sides in each debate are inconsis- 
tent with part of  the substance of  redistricting as just 
portrayed.  The results  of  our  analyses  define and 
establish new positions. They do not  fully support 
either  side in  what  were  previously  portrayed  as 
eitherlor debates but are consistent with the political 
substance of  legislative redistricting discussed here. 
Our empirical analysis also succeeds by using more 
powerful methods, more accurate information about 
more redistricting plans,  and dozens of  times more 
data than have heretofore been brought to bear on 
these problems. Our empirical results have important 
counterintuitive  policy  implications, since,  in total, 
they imply that the existence of  legislative redistrict- 
ing-and  even partisan-controlled gerrymandering- 
has beneficial effects on American electoral systems, 
increasing electoral responsiveness and reducing par- 
tisan bias. 
THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE AND 
PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS 
We shall begin by introducing the scholarly debates, 
proposing resolutions, and overviewing our empiri- 
cal results. 
Electoral Responsiveness 
Electoral  responsiveness  is  the  degree  to  which  the 
partisan  composition of  the legislature responds to 
changes in voter preferences.  Although  closely  re- 
lated concepts exist-including  the competitiveness 
of  the electoral system, the probability that an incum- 
bent  will  lose  a  reelection  bid,  the  frequency  of 
marginal seats, and the swing ratio-we  find electoral 
responsiveness (which we shall define precisely later) 
to be the most direct representation of  the relevant 
theoretical concevt of  intere~t.~ 
I 
Political scientists have typically taken two contra- 
dictory positions about the effect of  redistricting on 
the responsiveness of  an electoral system. One set of 
scholars maintain that partisan and bipartisan redis- 
tricting plans  reduce  electoral  responsiveness.  For 
example, Cain writes, "Because  incumbents tend to 
be risk averse-no  mar~n  of  safetv is too much-the 
result  [of  a  bipartisan yedistricti&  plan]  is  greater 
electoral inefficiency and more noncompetitive seats" 
(1985,  321).  Mayhew  (1971) and Tufte  (1973) also 
argue that bipartisan redistricting plans are primarily 
incumbent  protection,  hence  reducing  responsive- 
ness of  legislative seats to citizen votes. Owen and 
Grofman (1988) show theoretically that optimal parti- 
san  redistricting  plans  should  also  produce  a  less 
responsive electoral system. A different position has 
been argued by  another group of  scholars: "Redis- 
tricting has no influence at all on the swing ratio" 
(Ferejohn 1977; see also Burnham 1974). 
This is an imvortant scholarlv debate. but neither 
I  , 
position is fully consistent with our prior qualitative 
knowledge. For example, although some incumbents 
benefit from redistricting, all (or even most) do not. 
Many of  the incumbents of  the party not in control of 
the  process will  lose  support even if  they  are not 
actually  paired  into  the  same  districts.  Some  will 
intentionally reduce their general election support in 
order  to  avoid  a  primary.  Moreover,  because  of 
geographic constraints, redistricting even hurts some 
incumbents  of  the party  in control. Improving the 
partisan composition of  a district for one incumbent 
requires modifying the neighboring district bound- 
aries,  and neighboring districts are not always con- 
veniently  open  seats  or  held  by  opposition  party American Political Science Review  Vol. 88,  No. 3 
members. As a result, in addition to interparty com- 
petition,  redistricting  frequently  creates  intraparty 
competition among rational officeholders seeking to 
maximize  their  probability  of  reelection:  "[The] 
scrambling of  incumbents can have momentous im- 
portance for the election that follows the redistrict- 
ing'/  (Cain 1985, 331). 
How could redistricting have no effect on-or  even 
reduce-electoral  responsiveness when it loosens the 
hold  of  many incumbents  of  both  parties on their 
electoral constituencies and reduces their chances of 
reelection? In fact, our empirical results indicate that 
both prevailing positions in the literature are incor- 
rect.  Redistricting (whether partisan  or  bipartisan) 
tends, on average, to increase electoral responsiveness 
(see also Campagna and Grofman 1990; King 1989). 
Redistricting does this by  shaking up the political 
system and creating high levels of  uncertainty for all 
participants. Moreover, when redistricters draw lines 
by jointly maximizing the advantages to their party 
and their incumbents,  they create additional uncer- 
tainty and also produce a direct increase in respon- 
siveness by attempting to gain partisan advantage by 
creating  more  districts  with  smaller  likely  victory 
margins. 
Partisan Bias 
Partisan bias is the degree to which an electoral system 
unfairly favors one political party in the translation 
of  statewide (or nationwide) votes into the partisan 
division  of  the  legislature.  Politicians,  journalists, 
some judges,  and many  political  scientists believe 
that political parties in control of  redistricting pro- 
duce sizable effects on the degree of  partisan bias in 
the  electoral  system  (see  Abramowitz  1983;  Born 
1985;  Cranor,  Crawley,  and  Sheele  1989;  Erikson 
1972;  Gopoian and West  1984; Hacker 1963; Niemi 
and Winsky 1992). This results in important political 
consequences.  For  example,  Robert  Dixon  insists, 
"Apportionment  and  districting  decisions  are  pri- 
mary  determinants of  the quality of  representative 
democracy''  (1968, 14). As a state legislator explained 
to one of  us,  "Control of  redistricting here is worth 
$50 billion-the  value of  the state's budget per year 
for ten years." 
In contrast, much recent work in political science 
has found relatively minor partisan effects of  redis- 
tricting (Bullock 1975; Campagna and Grofman 1990; 
Ferejohn 1977; Glazer,  Grofman,  and Robbins 1987; 
Scarrow  1982).  Cain  argues  that  "even  the  most 
egregious partisan gerrymanders do not 'lock-in'  one 
party's control over the state: Districting only affects 
control of  a few seats, and it can be rendered mean- 
ingless  by  large  state or  national  shifts  in  voting 
patterns"  (1985, 226). Niemi and Jackrnan conclude 
that  "as  in  the  congressional case,  redistricting of 
state legislatures is less subject to partisan gerryman- 
dering and resulting partisan bias than popular com- 
mentary would suggest" (1991, 198). 
Thus,  one  side holds  that  gerrymanderers draw 
district lines in order to maximize only their party's 
seat advantage and have a large and lasting effect, 
while the other argues that whatever gerrymanderers 
maximize, they have only a small or transitory effect. 
Paradoxically, we find that both sides in this debate 
are  correct.  The  disagreement  appears  to  lie  in  a 
difference  over  the  precise  causal question  asked. 
From  the  perspective  of  a  close  observer  of  the 
process and the first group of  scholars, redistricting 
certainly has a partisan "effect",  but this effect is de- 
fined (implicitly) as the consequence of  Democratic- 
controlled  versus  bipartisan-  or  Republican-con- 
trolled redistricting. The causal effect of  interest  to 
this first group is the difference between bias in the 
electoral system when redistricting is controlled by 
Democrats versus Republicans (although  obviously 
only one kind of  redistricting is observed at any one 
time). Any good politician knows the consequences 
of  letting  the  opposition  party  draw  the  district 
boundaries.  We  find  that  the difference here  is as 
predicted: on average, redistricting favors the party 
that draws the lines more than if  the other party were 
to draw the lines. In fact, the effect is substantial and 
fades only very gradually over the following 10 years. 
The second group of  scholars in this debate finds 
no  "effects,"  or  else  finds  effects  that  disappear 
quickly over time. It appears that the causal question 
asked by this group is distinct from the first, focusing 
not on the difference between Democratic- and Re- 
publican-controlled redistricting but on the difference 
between the consequences of  redistricting versus no 
redistricting. We  find that on average, redistricting 
(either partisan  or bipartisan)  actually  reduces  the 
degree of  bias as compared to no redistricting. Most 
of  the especially effective partisan gerrymanders take 
a political system severely biased in favor of  one party 
and make it  slightly biased  in  favor  of  the  other, 
hence reducing the overall bias. This result does not 
contradict the position of  the first group, since parti- 
san plans do favor the party in control compared to 
bipartisan  plans,  but  they  all  reduce  the  overall 
degree of  bias compared to what would have been if 
no redistricting had occurred. We  now turn to the 
evidence for our claims. 
DATA 
Our data include every individual-level district elec- 
tion from every state legislative lower house in the 
United States that elected its members from solely 
single-member districts in any election from 1968 to 
1988. These data span 30  state legislatures, 60 redis- 
tricting~  (with 1,  2,  or  3 per  state),  267  statewide 
elections,  and 29,679  district-level elections, in total 
providing a much wider and more detailed base for 
comparative empirical analysis than has been previ- 
ously brought to bear on these problems.' 
Furthermore, in order to assess the effects of  redis- 
tricting, we must determine when redistrictings occur 
and whether each redistricting plan was Democratic- 
controlled, Republican-controlled, or biparti~an.~  Un- Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
fortunately, adequate information about state redis- 
tricting processes have never been compiled. Sources 
such  as  Hardy,  Heslop,  and  Anderson  1981 and 
Cortner 1970 and numerous court cases provide valu- 
able but insufficient information. Previous studies of 
political gerrymandering either analyze a single case 
or a few cases in depth (e.g.,  Cain 1984; King 1989; 
Scarrow 1982) or use only indirect evidence of  parti- 
san control  of  redistricting  (see Morrill  1990 for a 
partial exception). For example, Erikson (1972), Born 
(1985), and King and Browning (1987) infer control of 
redistricting processes indirectly by noting the party 
that controlled the state legislature and governorship, 
with special rules to deal with court challenges and 
other exceptions. (If  one party controlled all three, 
the plan was assumed to have been gerrymandered 
by that party; if  control was split, they concluded the 
plan was bipartisan.) This inferential procedure has 
the  advantage of  being  easy  to  implement  and is 
often correct, but it is misleading in many cases. For 
example,  some  state  constitutions  give  control  of 
redistricting to bipartisan commissions, regardless of 
who  controls the government. In  other states,  the 
courts have at times implemented the minority par- 
ty's redistricting plan (on grounds other than political 
gerrymandering but presumably with the  same ef- 
fect). And in all states, creative maneuvers by politi- 
cians, using techniques such as court challenges and 
legislative impasses, can cause redistricting to occur 
at times other than immediately following the decen- 
nial censuses.  Using these indirect methods causes 
many redistrictings to be missed and many of  those 
not missed to be misclassified. 
To  avoid  problems  with  existing measures,  we 
conducted  an  in-depth  study of  each  redistricting 
process in every state. We mailed a questionnaire to 
every  state  legislature,  requesting  the  names  and 
party affiliations of  all individuals who participated in 
the  redistricting process,  the  official  and unofficial 
rules of  the apportionment and disticting process, 
copies  of  the  final  redistricting  bills,  and  certain 
district  maps.  We  then  interviewed  state  election 
officials,  state court justices,  commission members, 
attorneys,  academics, legislators,  and political party 
officials, as well as looking at many state newspapers 
and scholarly literature. Throughout, the goal was to 
gauge the intention, rather than the perceived effect, 
or publicly stated goal,  of  a particular redistricting 
plan.  Regardless of  whether  the  redistricting  was 
implemented by a legislature, a governor, a commis- 
sion,  or  a  court,  we  categorized each  plan  by  its 
partisan intention. We finished collecting the redis- 
tricting data before calculating any estimates from our 
electoral  data  to  eliminate  possible  coder-induced 
endogeneity (in fact,  an early version  of  our  data 
were  used  almost three years ago;  see Niemi  and 
Jackman 1991). From this information, we identified 
60  redistrictings and classified each as Democratic- 
controlled, Republican-controlled, or biparti~an.~  The 
states, years, and classifications of  the redistrictings 
appear in Appendix B. 
DEFINING AND ESTIMATING 
ELECTORAL RESPONSIVENESS AND 
PARTISAN BIAS 
We  estimate  electoral responsiveness  and partisan 
bias  in  each  state legislature,  for  each  of  the  267 
election years, using the model described by Gelman 
and King  (1994) and the associated computer  pro- 
gram. Although we developed this statistical model 
to  estimate  bias  and responsiveness  in  legislative 
data, it has numerous other applications. This meth- 
odology is briefly summarized in Appendix A.  For 
each  state and  election  year,  we  calculate a point 
estimate and standard error for electoral responsive- 
ness and partisan bias and the same quantities in the 
counterfactual situation in which all incumbents sud- 
denly retire; we use these for all subsequent analyses. 
Results from our  numerous  auxiliary analyses  not 
reported here, with alternative measures of  these and 
related  concepts,  strongly  support our  substantive 
conclusions described. For each state election in the 
data  set,  our estimates  of  electoral responsiveness 
and partisan bias, along with the number of  seats in 
the legislative house, appear in Appendix B. 
In order to define these concepts more precisely, 
we define fi to be the average Democratic proportion 
of  the  two-party  vote  across districts in  the  state 
(corrected for  uncontested  seats;  see  Gelman  and 
King  1994 for  details) and  S to be  the  Democratic 
proportion  of  the seats in  the  legislature. We  also 
account for the effects of  differential turnout.1°  For 
each state's electoral system in each election year, we 
estimate electoral responsiveness and partisan bias. 
(We take our definition of  these concepts from King 
and Gelman 1991, which generalized the definitions 
introduced in King and Browning 1987 and King 1989.) 
Electoral Responsiveness 
We define electoral responsiveness as the change in the 
expected seat proportion given a small change in the 
vote proportion, from slightly more Democratic than 
the average district vote to slightly more Republican 
(see  King  and  Browning  1987;  Gelman  and  King 
1994). For present purposes, we use a swing of  1%  in 
each direction from the election outcome: responsive- 
ness is the average difference, [E(Slb + .01) -  E(3l0 - 
.01)], divided by the vote swing, -02.''  For example, 
a value of  responsiveness  of  1.0 is  (in the absence 
of  bias) de facto proportional representation. A value 
of  2.0  (approximately the  average value  across all 
the data we analyze) indicates that a 1%  increase in 
the average district vote share for Democratic candi- 
dates statewide will  produce a 2% increase in  the 
Democratic share of  the state legislature. Scholars of 
American politics almost uniformly take the norma- 
tive  position  that  higher  values  of  responsiveness 
indicate a healthier democracy (e.g.,  Ferejohn 1977). 
(In stark contrast, scholars from most other countries 
prefer  proportional  representation  and  therefore 
lower values of  responsiveness nearer 1.0; a valuable American Political Science Review  Vol. 88,  No. 3 
Electoral Responsiveness over Time in Each State, by Region 
Northeast 
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Source: Calculated from district-level electoral data using JUDGEIT  (Gelman and King 1993). For each state,  data are included only for years in which all 
elections were held in single-member districts. 
topic for future research would be to work out the 
conditions under which each normative standard is 
most  appropriate.)  Figure  1 presents  a  descriptive 
view  of  electoral responsiveness  over time in each 
state in our data set. Most states have responsiveness 
values between  1.0 and 3.0.  Excevt  for the South. 
I 
responsiveness  has  gradually  dropped  over  time, 
just as in the U.S. Congress (King and Gelman, 1991). 
As  the  Republicans  have  gained  strength  in  the 
South,  the legislatures of  southern states have be- 
come more competitive with increasing electoral re- 
sponsiveness. 
Partisan Bias 
Partisan bias is the deviation from partisan symmetry 
when the average district vote is between 0 = .45 and 
fi = -55. For example, if  one party is able to translate 
55% of  the average district vote into 75% of  the seats 
in the legislature, then it would be symmetric for the 
other party, too, when it receives 55% of  the average 
district vote, to receive 75% of  the seats. We define 
partisan  bias  as the  proportion  of  the  seats in the 
legislature that the Democrats receive over and above 
what is fair according to this symmetry criterion. A 
positive bias favors the Democrats, whereas a nega- 
tive value for bias indicates that the electoral system 
favors the Republicans. For example, if  partisan bias 
is -  .05, then the Democrats receive 5% fewer seats in 
the legislature than they should under the symmetry 
standard (and the Republicans receive 5% more seats 
than they should). 
Unlike electoral responsiveness,  estimating parti- 
san bias requires imagining what would happen if  the 
minority party were to become the majority party in 
some  future  election.  Although  this  is  obviously 
possible in any state, it is extremely unlikely in some. 
Forecasting what would happen if,  for example, the 
Republicans suddenly won a majority of  the Alabama 
legislature  is  beyond  the  scope  of  any  empirical 
analysis. We therefore limit our analysis to "compet- 
itive electoral systems,"  which we define as states in 
which each political party managed to garner a ma- 
jority of  seats or votes in at least one election between 
1968 to 1988. For the analysis of  bias, this reduces our 
data set to 16 states and 164 elections. Less restrictive 
definitions of  competitive do not materially change our 
substantive  result^.'^ 
Figure 2 displays our estimates of  partisan bias over 
time in  each  state (only for  "competitive  electoral 
systems"). Most of  the bias figures are between 5% 
favoring the Democrats to 5% favoring the Republi- 
cans. Partisan bias in these states seems to be trend- 
ing from favoring the  Republicans to  favoring the 
Democrats. This is also true of  the U.S.  House (see 
King and Gelman 1991). 
Finally, we also estimate what values each of  these 
three  quantities  would  be  if,  at  the  start  of  each Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
Partisan Bias over Time in Each State, by Region 
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Note: Positive values for estimated partisan bias on the vertical axes in these graphs indicate electoral systems that unfairly favor the Democratic Party; 
negative values indicate bias in favor of  the Republican Party. Calculated from district-level electoral data using JUDGEIT  (Gelman and King 1993). For each 
state, data are included only for years in which all elections were held in single-member districts. Only states with competitive electoral systems are 
included. 
election campaign, all incumbents decided not to run. 
This  simulated  universal  term  limitation helps  us 
ascertain the role of  incumbents in redistricting. We 
omit the analogous time series plots of  these figures, 
but  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the  changes  in 
incumbency over time, we present Figure 3. For each 
year in the data set, this figure displays the number of 
redistrictings in that year by the proportion of  incum- 
bents  running  for  election.13 A  line  connects  the 
points so one can easily trace the path of  the electoral 
system over time. Two patterns are clearly evident in 
this graph. First, from 1968 to 1988, the proportion of 
incumbents has increased from about 50% to nearly 
7076,  as portrayed in the graph by the line headed 
steadily upward. Second, the proportion of  incum- 
bents  clearly  decreases  during  redistricting  years. 
Figure 3 also portrays an important effect of  redistrict- 
ing.  Some  incumbents  are  undoubtedly  "retired" 
involuntarily by  redistricting  plans  that  eliminate 
their political base or pair them in districts, forcing 
them  to  run  against  each  other.  However,  many 
other incumbents probably also retire to avoid  the 
huge political  fight of  redistricting itself. If  a state 
legislator were thinking of  retiring (or running for 
another office) at some time over the next few elec- 
tions, then planning an exit to coincide with a redis- 
tricting would  save  a  lot  of  grief,  if  not  political 
defeat. 
A REGRESSION MODEL 
We conduct parallel analyses of  electoral responsive- 
ness and partisan bias.  Each variable has the state 
election  year  as the unit  of  analysis (n  = 267  for 
responsiveness  and  n  =  164  for  bias).  The  core 
analysis involves a straightforward regression model 
using each of  these dependent variables in turn. We 
present  the regression analysis of  each numerically 
and  then  provide  a  further  interpretation  of  these 
regression results with two forms of  graphical analysis. 
We denote Yi, as the dependent variable (electoral 
responsiveness or partisan bias), minus its mean, for 
election year t and state i.14 In addition, we define the 
following explanatory variables:15 redistricting,  R,,  is 
1 if  a redistricting occurred immediately before elec- 
tion year t in state i,  and 0 otherwise; partisan  redis- 
tricting,  Pit, is  -5 if  a redistricting occurred imme- 
diately before  election  year  t  in  state  i  and  was 
exclusively controlled by  one of  the major political 
parties,  -.5  if  the redistricting was bipartisan (con- 
trolled by both parties), and 0 otherwise; democratic- 
controlled redistricting,  D,,  is 1  if  the Democratic party 
controlled the redistricting immediately before elec- 
tion  year  t  in  state  i,  -1  if  the  redistricting was 
Republican-controlled,  and  0  otherwise;  and  state 
effects, Sit, are a set of  011 dummy variables represent- 
ing the states. American Political Science Review  Vol. 88. No. 3 
Proportion of Incumbents Versus Number of 
Redistrictings, over Time (Averaged over 17 States) 
number of redistrictings 
(out of 17 states) 
Regressions for Electoral Responsiveness.  We do not use 
all the explanatory variables for each regression. To 
assess the effects of  redistricting on electoral respon- 
siveness, we estimate the following linear regression: 
where pl, P2, p3, and p4 are regression coefficients, y 
is a vector of  regression coefficients, and (Yi,t-lRit)  is 
an interaction term calculated by taking the product 
of  the lagged dependent and redistricting variables.16 
Inclusion  of  the state variables,  Sit, is a standard 
procedure  recommended  in  time  series  cross-sec- 
tional  literature,  where  it  is  called a "fixed  effects 
model"  (Hsiao 1986; Stimson 1985). These variables 
enable us to pool different states safely, guaranteeing 
that we are comparing (for example) New York in one 
year  with New  York in another,  rather  than New 
York  in  one  year  with  Rhode  Island  in  another. 
(Including  all  the  state  variables  also  makes  the 
constant term in the regression unnecessary.) From a 
theoretical perspective, a random effects model might 
be preferred (e.g.,  Dempster, Rubin, and Tsutakawa 
1981). We repeated all our regressions with random 
state effects and found no major substantive changes 
in the results.17 
As such, estimating the coefficients in y is impor- 
tant,  but the values they take  on are not of  direct 
interest; we therefore omit these from our tables. The 
remaining coefficients are of  interest and are inter- 
preted  as  follows: P1  is  the  average  effect  of  any 
redistricting in increasing Y (responsiveness or bias); 
p2 is generally negative, indicating how much larger 
the effect of  redistricting is for small previous values 
of  Y and how much smaller it is for larger values of  Y 
(p2  is, equivalently, the drop in the persistence in the 
level of  responsiveness between two elections due to 
a redistricting intervening); P3 is the additional con- 
stant effect of  partisan versus bipartisan redistricting 
over and above the average effect; and p,  indicates 
the  persistence  of  Y over  time  in  the  absence  of 
redistricting.18 
Regressions for Partisan Bias.  To estimate the effects of 
redistricting on partisan bias, we change equation 1 
only by  substituting Pit with D,.  This changes the 
interpretation  of  p3 to the constant effect of  Demo- 
cratic- versus Republican-controlled redistricting over 
and above the average effect. The interpretation  of 
the other coefficients does not change. 
It  should  be  possible  to  improve  our  model  if 
additional data become  available,  but in the many 
alternative models and diagnostic tests we tried, we 
found no evidence to contradict the model in equa- 
tion  l. We  also  found  the  error  distribution  and 
autocorrelation structure of  the data to be consistent 
with the time series behavior of  the model.19 
Although we found no evidence of  nonlinearities, 
the empirical independence of  the lagged dependent 
variable  and  the  redistricting variables  makes  our 
specification unreliant upon the linearity assumption 
in  estimating  our  key  causal  effects.  Finally,  the 
substantive  results  we  are  about  to  present  were 
robust across all reasonable specifications that were 
consistent with the data. 
EVIDENCE 
We  present  our empirical  results first  for  electoral 
responsiveness and then for partisan bias.  We con- 
duct the analyses in each of  these sections in analo- 
gous fashion  and  explain  our procedures  in most 
detail in the first. 
Electoral Responsiveness 
Our regressions explaining electoral responsiveness 
appear in Table 1. Column 1 reports the estimated 
regression effects (with standard errors in parenthe- 
ses) on the actual level of  responsiveness. Column 2 
reports  estimates  for  a  regression  with  the  same 
explanatory  variables  but  with  a  forecast  of  what Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Responsiveness: 
Regression Estimates 
EXPLANATORY  NO 
VARIABLE  INCUMBENTS 
(PARAMETER)  ACTUAL  RUNNING 
Redistricting (&)  .47  .98 
(.08)  (.Ill 
Redistricting  -.I7  -  .20 
interaction (&)  0)  (.Ill 
Partisan redistricting  -  .23  -  .32 
(83)  C16)  (.21) 
Lagged responsiveness  .38  .17 
(84)  (.06)  (.06) 
Residual standard 
deviation (&)  .51  .64 
Note: Entries are coefficients from a weighted least squares regression; 
standard  errors appear  in  parentheses.  N = 237  election  years  (we 
dropped the first case in each state so that we could regress on the lagged 
variable). The state effects, S,,,  are also included in the regressions but 
are omitted from the table because  their  coefficients are not of  direct 
interest. 
electoral responsiveness would be under the situa- 
tion with no incumbents running as the dependent 
variable. We discuss these coefficients here, followed 
by a more detailed interpretation in several figures. 
The primary effect indicates that on average, redis- 
tricting increases responsiveness by about half  a point 
(-47 plus or minus the -08 standard error). This is a 
substantial effect, consistent with our qualitative un- 
derstanding that redistricting creates uncertainty by 
shaking up the political system and that redistricters 
are maximizing competing goals. Table 1 also indi- 
cates that the effect on responsiveness in a hypothet- 
ical  electoral  system  without  incumbents  is  even 
larger. Put differently, by adding incumbents into the 
electoral  system  and  redistricting process,  the  in- 
crease in responsiveness that results from redistrict- 
ing is lessened. We attribute this effect to incumbents 
trying to maximize their probability of  winning the 
general election, since our analysis holds constant all 
the other constraints we have observed. 
The "redistricting interaction" coefficient indicates 
that the effect of  redistricting is slightly larger when 
responsiveness is low, and smaller for higher values 
of  responsiveness. This is a "regression to the mean" 
that pushes  the effects of  all  types  of  redistricting 
toward a common level. The effect is not much larger 
than its standard error,  but our many experiments 
with  auxiliary  regressions  testing  this  hypothesis 
convinces us that this effect, although small, is real. 
As expected, the effect of  partisan versus bipartisan 
redistricting is small and imprecisely measured. The 
lag of  responsiveness indicates that in nonredistrict- 
ing years,  redistricting has a moderate level of  per- 
sistence, meaning that it is possible to  forecast re- 
sponsiveness from its previous values (and the state 
coefficients). Put differently, in the absence of  redis- 
tricting, electoral responsiveness is moderately per- 
sistent across elections. However. when a redistrict- 
ing occurs between these twp elections, most of  this 
persistence vanishes (since p,  + P2 is small). More- 
over,  virtually all of  the persistence of  responsive- 
ness across a redis%ictingnis  due to the presence of 
incumbents  (since p4 +  P2  is  approximately 0 for 
Table 1,  column 2). 
That  the  persistence  of  responsiveness  across  a 
redistricting is  due largely  to  the incumbents  and 
their districts is consistent with information we gath- 
ered in interviews with district-mav-makers. That is, 
those nominally in charge of  redistricting, as well as 
the people who sit at the computers, drawing lines on 
maps, almost uniformly report that finding satisfac- 
tory districts for incumbents is their most important 
constraint. They also report that the constraint posed 
by  the  presence  of  incumbents  is  the  one  of  the 
biggest factors in making their job  difficult. 
Immediate Effects of  Redistricting on Responsiveness.  Fig- 
ures 4 and 5 portray the effects of  redistricting on 
responsiveness graphically, displaying both the data 
and the regression results in Table 1. Figure 4 illus- 
trates the immediate effects of  redistricting by plot- 
ting the lagged value of  responsiveness by the cur- 
rent  value  (adjusted  for  the  state  effects  by 
subtracting from each value the estimated coefficient 
for  the corresponding state dummy variable). This 
figure highlights every data point as well as all the 
regression  coefficients;  it  also  emphasizes  exactly 
how the regression summarizes the data in this case. 
Each of  the 237 state elections appears in this plot as 
a dot (for elections without redistrictings), an asterisk 
(for years preceded by bipartisan redistrictings), or 
the letter P (for years preceded by partisan redistrict- 
ings). For  each point, the responsiveness estimated 
from that statewide election avvears on the vertical 
L L 
axis (after being corrected for the appropriate state 
effect),  and  the  estimated  responsiveness  in  the 
state's vrevious election is shown on the horizontal 
axis. ~ke  most important effect in this figure is that 
most of  the points labeled P and * are higher on the 
vertical axis (for a given value of  the horizontal axis) 
than the dots. This shows directly that responsive- 
ness is higher in years following redistricting even 
after controlling for responsiveness in the previous 
election (and adjusting for state means). 
We also plot the regression lines, fitted to the three 
types  of  election  years,  to  help  highlight  avefage 
effects. The coefficient of  lagged responsiveness, P4 = 
-38, is the slope of  the line labeled "no redistricting." 
The increase in responsiveness due to redistricting is 
portrayed by  the vertical distance between  the no- 
redistricting line and the partisan or bipartisan redis- 
tricting lines. The distance between  the differently 
sloped lines at the center of the graph is the average 
?ffectpf redistricting: P, -  P,  = -70 for bipartisan and 
p,  + P3 = -24 for partisan redistricting. The difference 
between  the  slopes of  the regression line  is  P2 = 
-  -17. As can be plainly seen, the effect of  redistricting 
is large for small values of  lagged responsiveness (at American Political Science Review  Vol. 88,  No. 3 
Effect of Redistricting on Electoral Responsiveness, Next Election 
H  .  .  ,P  p 
5%  '9  - 
.r iij  bipartisan redistricting 
2  parusan redistricting 
B,o 
$3 
UG  - 
s? 2  mu 
E 5  .-  +- 
w" 
7-.  ..  . 
Estimated responsiveness in last election 
the left). Or, equivalently, the persistence of  respon- 
siveness (as represented by the steepness of  the line) 
is much greater in the absence of  redistricting. 
Figure 4 helps convey, better than the coefficients 
in  Table  1 can  alone,  the  appropriateness  of  our 
regression model for this problem. (For example, one 
can  see  the  dots  on  this  graph  clearly  clustered 
around the no-redistricting line and below the aster- 
isks and Ps.) Perhaps the most important feature of 
the graph,  confirming that the assumptions of  our 
regression model cannot be rejected by the data, is 
the absence  of  any  systematic  pattern  in  the  data 
points except those picked up  by the regression lines. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the unpredictability of  redis- 
tricting: even after controlling for the lagged respon- 
siveness and state effects, the points on the graph are 
quite variable. The strong average effects revealed by 
the regression do not apply to all individual cases. 
Effect of Redistricting on Electoral Responsiveness, Next Five Elections 
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Note: The figure shows, for three typical cases, the average effects of  a bipartisan plan,  relative to what would have happened with no redistricting. 
Source: Calculated from our JUDGEIT  results and the regression in Table 1. Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
Longer-Term  Effects  of  Redistricting  on  Responsiveness. 
Figure 5 displays the average effects on responsive- 
ness  (relative  to  any  trend)  for  the  five  elections 
following a redistricting. The horizontal axis indicates 
the number of  elections since redistricting,  with the 
vertical dashed line indicating the implementation of 
a bipartisan redistricting plan.20 To show the differ- 
ential  effects  of  redistricting,  Figure  5  gives  three 
examples,  distinguished by the level of  responsive- 
ness  in  the  election before  redistricting.  All  three 
examples show again that,  on average, redistricting 
sharply increases responsiveness in the first election, 
with the largest effect occurring for states that had 
low responsiveness before the redistricting.  The ef- 
fects in the graph are calculated from the regression 
in Table 1  and the implied AR(1) time series model. 
Figure 5 shows that the average redistricting effect 
is very large in the first year, moderate in the second, 
much smaller in the third,  and nonexistent for the 
fourth and last years.  The effect  of  redistricting  in 
increasing responsiveness does not last until the fifth 
election,  implying  that  redistricting  is  unlikely  to 
contribute  to  longer-term  trends.  Hence,  the exis- 
tence  of  many redistrictings  increasing responsive- 
ness is consistent with a secular decline in respon- 
siveness  over  the  two  decades  in  our  study  (see 
Figure 1).  However, this pattern does not mean that 
the effect of  redistricting on responsiveness is unim- 
portant. On the contrary, in the typical state, redis- 
tricting  occurs after  every fifth  election,  and,  as a 
result, its electoral system benefits from higher levels 
of  responsiveness  for  roughly  half  of  all  elections 
solely  because  of  redistricting.  Redistricting  thus 
boosts the responsiveness of  a state electoral system 
significantly higher than it would  otherwise be  for 
about half  of  all elections. Although any single redis- 
tricting does not have permanent effects, the decen- 
nial redistricting process is a permanent part of  every 
state's  electoral  system.  As  a  result,  redistricting 
continually and fundamentally alters the character of 
representative democracy. 
Partisan Bias 
In addition to its effect on responsiveness, legislative 
redistricting  has an important effect on the relative 
fortunes  of  the  political  parties.  Redistricting  can 
affect the proportion of  seats that a party controls in 
the legislature in two ways. The first, which has been 
the subject of  speculation in the literature but only 
rarely of  empirical analyses, is the effect of  redistrict- 
ing on the average district vote. The second is what 
we call partisan bias-the  effect of  redistricting on the 
allocation of  seats between  the  parties  given  their 
average district votes. The ultimate effect of  redistrict- 
ing on the division of  parties in the legislature is the 
sum  of  these  two  effects.  One  can  use  the  seat 
proportion  as the dependent variable in a separate 
regression to estimate this sum directly.  Like most 
researchers,  we  prefer  a  separate  estimate  of  the 
effects  on partisan  bias  so  that  we can  judge  the 
fairness of  the electoral system. 
Effects of Redistricting on Partisan Bias: Regression 
Estimates 
EXPLANATORY  NO 
VARIABLE  INCUMBENTS 
(PARAMETER)  ACTUAL  RUNNING 
Redistricting (p,)  -.012  -  ,012 
(.004)  (.004) 
Redistricting  -  .63  -.77 
interaction (3.J  (.16) 
Democratic  ,010  .003 
redistricting (p,)  (.005)  (.006) 
Lagged bias (p,)  .77  .55 
607)  (.09) 
Residual standard 
deviation (&)  .014  .015 
Note: Entries are coefficients from a weighted least squares regression; 
standard  errors  appear  in  parentheses.  The  dependent  variable  is 
estimated partisan bias; as in Figure 2,  where this variable is displayed, 
positive values indicate state electoral systems which favor the Demo- 
crats and negative values indicate bias in favor of  the Republicans. N  = 
143 election years (all but the first election in our data set for all states 
whose electoral systems were "competitive").  The state effects,  S,,,  are 
also included in these regressions but are omitted from the table because 
their coefficients are not of  direct interest. 
lmmediate Effects  of  Redistricting on  Partisan  Bias.  We 
begin by estimating the regression with bias as the 
dependent variable, conducted in a manner parallel 
to  that  for  responsiveness.  The  results  appear  in 
Table 2. Many of  the key results here are easier to 
interpret in conjunction with the graphs in Figures 6 
and 7.  To  begin,  note  that Figure  6 indicates that 
partisan bias is rarely greater than about 8% (on both 
axes) in  favor  of  either  party.  We  believe  this  is 
because of  the numerous constraints on gerryman- 
derers, as described in the introduction. We turn now 
to the effects of  redistricting on bias by looking first at 
the baseline of  the effect of  lagged bias on current bias 
in the absence of  redistricting.  This is portrayed in 
Figre  6 as a no-redistricting line with the steep slope 
of  p4 =  .77  and indicates  that  in  the  absence  of 
redistricting,  the level of  bias tends to persist much 
longer than for responsiveness. Because the slope of 
this line is almost 1, partisan bias changes very little 
in the absence of  redistricting.  We therefore expect 
that whatever effect redistricting has on bias, its effect 
will take a long time to dissipate. 
From this baseline, we can now examine the effects 
of  redistricting.  On average, redistricting makes the 
typical state's  electoral system fairer (closer to zero 
bias)  than it  would be if  redistricting  had  not  oc- 
curred. This effect  is illustrated in Figure  6 by  the 
asterisks, circles, and triangles (indicating that bipar- 
tisan,  Democratic,  or  Republican  redistricting,  re- 
spectively,  occurred  between  the  two  elections), 
which are generally much closer to 0 on the vertical 
axis than the dots (election years without redistrict- 
ing).  This  means  that  state  electoral  systems  are 
closer  to  no  partisan  bias  following  redistrictings. American Political Science Review  Vol. 88. No. 3 
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This effect is summarized by the three redistricting 
lines being much flatter (and closer to 0 on the vertical 
axis for most of  the range of  the horizontal axis) than 
the no-redistricting line. (The difference in the slopes 
of  the redistricting  and no-redistricting  lines is the 
redistricting interaction coefficient, p2 = -  .63.) 
Thus,  no matter how fair or biased  the electoral 
system is to begin with, the typical redistricting plan, 
whether Democratic, Republican, or bipartisan-con- 
trolled, will produce a fairer electoral system.''  This 
result  is  consistent  with  evidence  from  individual 
cases  in  which  the  largest  effects  of  redistricting 
change an existing huge bias in favor of  one party to 
small bias in favor of  the other.22 
The reason that any redistricting reduces bias ap- 
pears to be the role that redistricting has in shaking 
up the political system in combination with the many 
constraints on the mapmakers. Shaking up a system 
that is effectively constrained to have partisan bias 
between about -c8% of  fairness cannot have an enor- 
Elections after redistricting 
Effect of Redistricting on Partisan Bias, Next Five Elections 
IDemocratic-mntmlled  redistricting plan implemented 
Note: The figure shows, for three typical cses, the average effects of  a Democratic plan,  relative to what would have happened with no redistricting. 
Source: Calculated from our JUDGEIT  results and the regression in Table 2. 
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mous effect (although much  smaller effects will be 
quite significant to individual incumbents and politi- 
cal parties). Moreover, if  there is already a high level 
of  bias, due to the previous decade's redistricting (or, 
more likely, to demographic and mobility changes in 
the population over the decade), any political turmoil 
will have a higher probability of  moving the system 
toward fairness since there is simply more room to 
move in that direction. 
This powerful role redistricting has in producing 
fairer  electoral systems does not imply that Demo- 
cratic redistrictings produce  the same result  as Re- 
publican  or  bipartisan  ones.  To  the  contrary,  the 
order of  ths three redistricting lines in Figure 6 (and 
the effect  p3 in Table 2) indicates that Democratic- 
controlled redistricting plans typically bias the elec- 
toral system toward the Democrats by about 1%  (with 
a standard error of  .5%) more than a bipartisan plan. 
Republican-controlled plans favor the Republicans by 
about  the  same  amount.  Thus,  the  difference be- 
tween a Democratic- and Republican-controlled re- 
districting plan is, on average, an increase in partisan 
bias  of  about  2% for  the  party  in  control  (and  a 
corresponding decrease  of  about  2% for  the  other 
party).23  The variability of  individual results in Figure 
6 also indicates that redistricting can have somewhat 
more or less powerful effects than the average results 
summarized by the regression lines. With fewer data, 
less efficient statistical methods,  or less careful cate- 
gorization of  redistrictings by  partisan  control, we 
may not have been able to distinguish the systematic 
partisan  effects  of  redistricting  from  the  inherent 
variability in the system (as seemed to be the case 
with some existing research). 
Finally, Table 2,  column 2,  displays the effects of 
redistricting on partisan bias in the hypothetical sit- 
uation where no incumbents run for reelection. The 
partisan effect of  redistricting, P3, is statistically (and 
substantively)  indistinguishable  from  zero  in  this 
case. Since incumbents are key actors in either draw- 
ing the  lines  or  influencing the  line-drawers,  this 
result is fully consistent with the substance of  redis- 
tricting that we portrayed in the introduction. Incum- 
bents lead the troops into most redistricting battles. 
That they  and their vote-getting abilities would be 
considered as givens when drawing the district lines 
is just what we would expect. If,  as in our counter- 
factual condition, many incumbents were unexpect- 
edly defeated, the redistricting might turn out to have 
very different political consequences. 
Thus,  partisan-controlled redistricting plans  pro- 
duce electoral systems that favor the party in control 
more than the opposition party. However, the range 
of  possible outcomes that any redistricter is able to 
produce,  given the complicated constraints and un- 
certainties, is usually in the neighborhood  of  near- 
zero bias. The differences within this neighborhood 
are still highly significant to the partisans (as we shall 
further  demonstrate), but  the  overall  existence  of 
redistricting constrains bias to within this small and 
comparatively fair range. 
Longer-Term Effects of  Redistricting on  Partisan Bias.  We 
examine the effects of  redistricting on partisan bias 
over the next five elections with Figure 7,  which is 
based on the regression (and the implied autoregres- 
sive time series model with interventions) in Table 2, 
column 1. This figure is directly analogous to Figure 
5,  except that the only intervention represented here 
is  a Democratic-controlled  redistricting plan.  (Esti- 
mates for the effects of  a Republican-controlled plan 
are a mirror image of  these.) As can be seen clearly by 
the three  lines converging from  election  year  0 to 
election year 1,  large Republican  and even Demo- 
cratic biases are substantially reduced because of  this 
redistricting. However,  the Democrats still produce 
an electoral system biased  in  their  favor,  since all 
three lines are above zero. Finally,  we can see that 
this immediate effect persists in large measure over 
the remaining election years before the next redis- 
tricting. 
Effect of Redistricting on the Average District Vote 
We studied the effect of  redistricting on votes with 
the same regression model we developed for bias but 
using d in place of  bias as the outcome variable and 
also  including  dummy  variables  for  each  election 
year, to control for national swings in the vote. The 
results  indicate that partisan  redistrictings increase 
the  proportion  of  votes  for  the  candidates  of  the 
controlling party by an average of  about 1%  (plus or 
minus  a standard error  of  .5%) as compared  to  a 
bipartisan redistricting. Because responsiveness aver- 
aged over all states and elections in our data is about 
2.0,  this effect on votes typically increases the  seat 
proportion for the party controlling the redistricting 
by about 2% (the 1  % effect on votes multiplied by the 
typical responsiveness of  2.0)  as compared to bipar- 
tisan control. Thus, the difference in seats between a 
Democratic- and Republican-controlled redistricting 
plan is,  on average, a substantial 4% of  seats. The 
causal  mechanism  by  which  this  effect  works  is 
probably as follows. A partisan redistricting produces 
additional districts that the party in control of  redis- 
tricting is likely to win, as we have demonstrated. As 
a  result,  this  party  finds  it  easier  to  field  better 
candidates, which, in turn, produces more votes for 
those candidates (see Cain 1985; Canon,  Schousen, 
and Sellers 1993).'~ 
Unlike  the  other  regression  models  estimated 
herein, the regression for votes relies very heavily on 
the assumption of  linearity in order to establish the 
causal effect of  redistricting. The reason is that only in 
the model for votes are the key  causal effects (the 
redistricting variables) highly correlated with one of 
the control variables (lagged votes). That is,  states 
with higher Democratic vote proportions in the elec- 
tion before redistricting are more likely to have Dem- 
ocratic-controlled  redistricting  plans  implemented. 
The  correlation with  the  lagged  variable  is  much 
weaker in the regressions  for bias  and responsive- 
ness. The dependence on the linearity assumption of 
our inference for the effect of  redistricting on votes is American Political Science Review  Vol. 88,  No.  3 
well within  the standards followed throughout  the 
social sciences where key causal variables are often 
highly correlated with important control variables. As 
such, we are confident of  these estimates. However, 
we do not proceed with more detailed analyses of  this 
effect (including such features as its persistence over 
time, as we did for responsiveness), since they would 
not be as certain as all other results herein, where we 
are in the fortunate situation of  having causal infer- 
ences  that  meet  even  higher  standards (and thus 
greater certainty) than usual. 
Total Effect of Redistricting 
Finallv,  we  can  add the  effect  of  redistricting  on  ,  ,  " 
partisan bias (seats given a fixed average district vote) 
to the effect of  redistricting on the division of  votes 
between the parties. This sum gives the total effect of 
redistricting on the division of  seats in the legislature 
between the parties: if  one party controls a redistrict- 
ing plan, it can expect, on average, to receive approx- 
imately 6% of  the seats that the other party would 
have won if  it controlled the redistricting. That is, the 
party drawing the district lines receives, on average, 
about 6% more seats-and  the opposition party 6% 
fewer seats-than  if  the opposition party  had con- 
trolled the mapmaking. Thus, even though redistrict- 
ing makes  the  electoral  system  substantially  fairer 
overall than if  there were no redistricting, the differ- 
ence  between  Democratic  and  Republican  control 
over  the drawing of  district maps is still one that 
politicians are rightfully concerned about. 
We also estimated the effect of  redistricting on seats 
directly, by regressing seats S  on redistricting type, 
controlling for state effects, lag seats, the lag-redis- 
tricting interaction (as usual),  and election year ef- 
fects. The results of  this regression-an  effect of  3.2% 
for the party controlling redistricting, with a standard 
error of  1.3%-are  consistent with our separate anal- 
ysis of  votes and bias. (An effect of  3.2% for partisan 
redistricting  corresponds  to  6.4% when comparing 
Democratic  to  Republican  plans.)  In  general,  we 
prefer to analyze votes and bias separately, because 
each  is  an  important  consequence  of  the  partisan 
effect of  redistrictingz5 We  see the direct regression 
of  seats as  a  confiimation  of  our  more  important 
results. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE 
BENEFITS OF REDISTRICTING 
As  described,  our  empirical results  are  consistent 
with the conflictual and uncertain process of  legisla- 
tive redistricting and the competing goals of  redis- 
tricters. They also help resolve two important contro- 
versies in American politics over the consequences of 
legislative redistricting for partisan bias and electoral 
responsiveness.  For  one,  our  results  demonstrate 
that contrary to all previous researchers, redistricting 
in state legislatures has substantially increased elec- 
toral responsiveness and kept it higher than it would 
be otherwise for  about half  of  all  elections in each 
state.  The  effects  of  any  one  redistricting  are  not 
permanent,  but  the  decennial  redistricting process 
repeatedly injects the political system with a healthy 
dose of  increased responsiveness. For partisan bias, 
we have identified a difference in the causal question 
asked by  two  groups of  researchers,  making both 
sides  in  this  controversy  correct to a degree.  Our 
results indicate that partisan and bipartisan redistrict- 
ing plans reduce bias overall, leading to fairer elec- 
toral systems than if  there had been no redistricting, 
but the difference between Democratic-, bipartisan-, 
and Republican-controlled redistricting plans within 
this smaller and comparatively fairer region are still 
politically significant. 
We  now briefly  organize these results  from two 
perspectives. First, individual legislators involved in 
redistricting can be seen as simultaneously attempt- 
ing to maximize three partly inconsistent goals: they 
try to increase the probability of  winning or avoiding 
a primary, winning the general election (conditional 
on winning the primary), and helping their party win 
a majority of  seats in the legislature. Those responsi- 
ble for drawing the district lines, whether partisan or 
bipartisan,  always operate in  a highly  constrained 
and uncertain  environment.  The final redistricting 
plan is usually the result of  the process of  achieving 
consensus among incumbents and others, subject to 
the  formal  and  informal  constraints;  this  process 
usually produces a plan that weights party advantage 
heavily. 
When  incumbents  give up votes  in  order to in- 
crease the probability of  being in the majority party, 
responsiveness  increases.  It  also  increases  when 
other  incumbents  retire  to avoid the  political fight 
altogether and due merely to changes in district lines 
and to wholesale increases in uncertainty. Giving up 
votes in this way also means that Democratic-con- 
trolled redistricting plans usually  favor  the Demo- 
crats more than those controlled by the Republicans. 
However, in order to retain their seats, they do not go 
too far in trying to achieve this goal. Hence, partisan 
bias does not favor their party as much as it could. 
These constraints on partisan bias during redistrict- 
ing are much more substantial than during the rest of 
the decade, when changes in demographics, turnout, 
and the configuration of  candidates can cause com- 
paratively larger changes in bias and responsiveness. 
A second way to organize these results is to review 
what they say about the benefits and costs of  redis- 
tricting for  states'  representative  democracies. The 
purpose  of  reapportionment and redistricting is  to 
guarantee that the number of  citizens in each district 
if  roughly  the  same,  at  least  at  the  start  of  each 
decade.  Redistricting  obviously  accomplishes  this 
minimal goal. However,  as most political scientists 
recognize, population equality guarantees almost no 
form of  fairness beyond  the  numerical equality of 
population.  Even aside from issues raised by count- 
ing  citizens  (rather than  voting-age Americans  or 
voters), by  representing ethnic minorities fairly,  or Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
attempting to ensure that each citizen has an equal 
say in the policy outcome (which may be impossible 
to  achieve,  given such internal  legislative  rules  as 
seniority on committees), there are the questions of 
what redistricting does intentionally or unintention- 
ally to the features of  our representative democracy 
that we have discussed here. Allowing state legisla- 
tors to redistrict opens up the possibility of  partisan 
gerrymanders,  incumbent  protection  plans,  and 
other apparently insidious consequences of  the sim- 
ple task of  drawing district lines around equal-sized 
groups of  Americans. 
The vast majority of  American political scientists 
have  adopted  the  normative position  that  healthy 
representative democracies have low levels of  parti- 
san bias and high levels of  electoral responsiveness. 
Our empirical results should make those who sup- 
port this dominant position yearn for the next redis- 
tricting period. The political turmoil created by legis- 
lative redistricting creates political renewal. Many of 
the goals sought by  proponents of  term limitations 
are solved by legislative redistricting. Even the repu- 
tation of  the "egregious"  partisan gerrymander has 
been  somewhat rehabilitated: not  only does redis- 
tricting perform the simple task of  getting the num- 
bers  right,  but  redistricting  has  tended  to  reduce 
partisan bias and increase electoral responsiveness. 
It is true that bipartisan redistricting produces as 
high  levels of  responsiveness  and lower  levels  of 
partisan  bias  than  partisan-controlled  redistricting 
plans.  Moreover,  Democratic- and Republican-con- 
trolled plans have very different consequences for the 
parties.  One can also still find specific examples of 
substantial  partisan  gerrymanders  that  produce 
much more partisan bias. These results provide good 
reason  to  support  a proposal  to require bipartisan 
control of  all redistricting processes. If  a legislature is 
incapable  of  forging a bipartisan  agreement,  then 
alternating,  or  randomly assigned, control of  redis- 
tricting would  also  accomplish many  of  the  same 
benefits. Our results demonstrate that earlier objec- 
tions to this proposal based on the belief  that it will 
usually create incumbent protection plans (and hence 
unresponsive electoral systems) are unfounded. 
Finally,  our results bear  directly on the role  the 
courts might choose in resolving partisan gerryman- 
dering  claims.  The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  declared 
partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable in Davis v. 
Bandemer (1986), but it has not yet made clear whether 
the standards of  fairness will be set so that a plaintiff 
would have a chance of  meeting them. On the basis 
of  its recent decisions (e.g.,  Voinovich v. Quilter 1993), 
it seems clear that the Supreme Court would proba- 
bly prefer not to be involved in partisan redistricting 
matters,  and our results provide them with a clear 
public policy  ju~tification.'~  Individual  state redis- 
tricting  plans  sometimes  do  produce  very  unfair 
electoral systems, but on average, recent state redis- 
tricting~,  even when unattended by the courts, have 
reduced partisan bias and increased responsiveness. 
Far from being a scourge on the political system in 
need  of  major  reforms,  legislative redistricting has 
invigorated American representative democracy. 
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATING 
RESPONSIVENESS AND BIAS 
We  used  the method  of Gelman and King (1994), 
implemented  in  our  computer  program  called 
JUDGEIT  (Gelman and King  1993),  to  estimate  the 
electoral responsiveness and partisan bias from indi- 
vidual district-level data in each state legislative elec- 
tion. The results of  these estimations are displayed in 
Figures 1 and 2.  (JUDGEIT  and the statistical model 
underlying  our  method  are  described  in  detail  in 
Gelman and King 1994.) Our method is a straightfor- 
ward and substantially improved version of  our pre- 
vious method (see Gelman and King 1990; King and 
Gelman 1991) for defining, estimating, predicting, or 
evaluating under counterfactual conditions concepts 
such as  seats-votes  curves,  partisan  bias,  electoral 
responsiveness,  the  expected or  predicted  vote  in 
each district in  a legislature, the probability that  a 
given party  will  win  the  seat  in  each  district,  the 
proportion  of  incumbents  or  others who  will  lose 
their  seats,  the  proportion  of  women  or  minority 
candidates to be elected, the incumbency advantage 
and  other  causal  effects,  the  likely  effects  on  the 
electoral system and district votes of  proposed  elec- 
toral reforms (e.g., term limitations, campaign spend- 
ing limits, and drawing majority-minority  districts), 
and any other properties of  an electoral system that 
can be defined in terms of  vote shares in districts. The 
method is based  on a statistical model that can be 
applied to virtually any legislature with  two major 
parties and plurality rule elections in districts. 
Here we  shall briefly  outline how  our model is 
applied  to  estimating  responsiveness  and  partisan 
bias. As described, we define these quantities based 
on the seats-votes  curve, which in turn we define as 
the expected proportion  of  seats, given the average 
district vote.  (These definitions were first given in 
Gelman and King 1990 and King and Gelman 1991 
and are based on King and Browning 1987 and King 
1989.) A large literature on the seats-votes  curve has 
accumulated over the past half-century, and several 
methods have been applied to estimate the function 
of  seats,  given votes  (or, more precisely,  expected 
seats, given votes). One approach, which uses mini- 
mal modeling assumptions, is to estimate the seats- 
votes curve by a regression of  aggregate results from 
several election  years;  see,  e.g.,  Tufte  1973). This 
approach suffers from inefficiency (using aggregate, 
not district-level, vote information) and, more impor- 
tantly,  cannot  be  used  to  measure  year-to-year 
changes, such as we are interested in here. The other 
traditional  approach  to  estimating  the  seats-votes 
curve  has  been  based  on  the  model  of  "uniform 
partisan swing" (see, e.g.,  Butler 1951), a determin- 
istic model that, without modification, applies to no 
known electoral system. American Political Science Review  Vol.  88,  No.  3 
Our method  can  be  seen  as  a generalization  of 
uniform  partisan  swing,  with  two  major improve- 
ments. First, we model variability in district election 
outcomes beyond a uniform statewide  swing,  thus 
making  the  model  far  more  realistic.  Second,  we 
include explanatory variables to improve predictions, 
thus harnessing the full power of  regression model- 
ing for  district-level data.  We  also verified  each of 
these assumptions in extensive analyses of  all avail- 
able data on state legislative and congressional elec- 
tions. We here use past election results, uncontested 
status, the party of  the winner in the previous elec- 
tion,  and incumbency as  explanatory variables.  In 
addition, we treat uncontested  elections in a special 
way (see Gelman and King 1994). 
Although our model applies to any electoral system 
with two parties  or  groups of  parties,  we  use the 
labels "Democratic"  and "Republican"  to  fix  ideas 
more clearly. We assume a legislature comprising n 
single-member districts and denote vi  as the Demo- 
cratic proportion of  the two-party vote in each district 
i and v as the set of  votes for all districts (v,,  v,,  . . . , 
v,).  The votes v will be predicted by  k  explanatory 
variables,  which  can  together be  written as n  x  k 
matrix, X.  We model the district vote outcomes with 
a random components linear regression of  v on X,  v = 
Xp + y + E,  where p is a vector of  k parameters that 
we estimate from each state election, and y and E are 
two vectors of  independent error terms. The variable 
E is a traditional random error term; y is the "random 
component"  error term, which helps correct for the 
fact that the X variables do not completely describe 
the state of  the electoral system at the start of  the 
campaign due to the omission of  relevant variables 
and  measurement  error  in  the  variables included. 
For  each  district  i,  the  error  terms  are  assigned 
independent normal distributions,  yi -  N(0, a;),  ei - 
N(0, a:),  with variances a; and a:  that we estimate 
from several years of  election data for each state. 
The parameters of  this model to be estimated-4, 
4,  and @--are  not  usually  of  primary  interest  in 
evaluating electoral systems and redistricting plans 
(although p is in some cases of  interest in evaluating 
causal effects). Instead, we define theoretically all the 
quantities  of  interest,  including  the  seats-votes 
curve,  responsiveness,  and partisan bias,  and then 
compute posterior distributions of  all these quantities 
using Bayesian simulation. The estimates and stan- 
dard errors of  responsiveness and partisan bias used 
in this study are just the posterior mean and standard 
deviation of  these quantities, estimated separately for 
each state election. 
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATES OF BIAS 
AND RESPONSIVENESS FOR 
STATE ELECTIONS 
The posterior mean estimates, along with redistrict- 
ing information, are presented in Table B-1. Posterior 
standard deviations, as well as the district-level data 
upon which the estimates were based, are available 
from  the  Inter-University Consortium  for  Political 
and Social Research in a Class V data set under the 
authors' names, or from the authors. Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
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Vote: Electoral responsiveness and partisan bias are estimates computed using the JudgeIt program,  as outlined in Appendix A. Responsiveness is the 
2xpected change in Democratic proportion of  seats per change in average Democratic proportion of  votes in a state; for example, a responsiveness of  2 
neans that a swing of  1% in average district vote will cause (on average) a 2% swing in seats.  Bias is the expected  average difference between  the 
Iemocratic and Republican proportions of  seats when their proportions of  the vote range from .45 to .55; for example, a -2%  bias roughly corresponds 
o the Democrats receiving 48% of  the seats from 50% of  the vote. In our main analysis, we only use the bias figures for states with competitive elections, 
IS discussed in the text. Legislative Redistricting  September 1994 
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1. We learned of  this story from telephone interviews with 
justices,  politicians,  and  civil  servants  in  Michigan,  while 
collecting our data. 
2.  In private conversations with us,  members of  Congress 
often volunteer their strong support for increasing the size of 
Congress so that no state would lose a member at redistricting 
time. However, they also believe that such a proposal would 
not stand a chance of  passing because it seems so self-serving. 
3.  For  example,  we  observed  several  white  Democratic 
legislators in one state succeed in drawing many black voters 
out of  their districts.  Because blacks vote overwhelming for 
the Democrats,  this  action reduced  these legislators'  likely 
general  election  vote  margins,  if  they  got  to  the  general 
election. However, since voters often prefer to be represented 
by others from their ethnic group, these new district lines may 
have increased  these white  legislators'  probabilities of  win- 
ning or avoiding a primary election. 
4.  During the redistricting process in one state, we spoke to 
an incumbent whose new district would have probably given 
him about 75% of  the vote, almost exactly what he had before 
the redistricting. Yet  he went to great extents to oppose the 
new plan because the opposition party, which controlled the 
redistricting,  had,  as he said, "ruined  his life."  It previously 
took him under an hour to drive to anywhere in his district, 
but the new district would be stretched almost all the way 
across the state. In addition, all four of  his district offices and 
even his childrens'  schools were drawn out of  the district. 
5.  Even trying to improve their party's chance of  winning a 
majority of  seats is in the narrow self-interest of  incumbent 
legislators, since majority party members in most states have 
more staff, are chairs of  committees, gain additional visibility, 
and are better able to accomplish their policy goals and satisfy 
their constituents. As one legislator explained it to us, being 
in the majority party is also "a  lot more fun." 
6.  We have applied the methods described herein to other 
measures of  electoral competitiveness and found only trivial 
substantive differences from the results reported in the text 
using our responsiveness measure. 
7.  We have checked a sample of  these ICPSR data with our 
own data coded  directly from the blue books  published by 
several  state  governments.  We  found  a  few  errors  (and 
reported  them  to  the  ICPSR),  but  overall  these  data  are 
remarkably clean and far more reliable than, for example, the 
ICPSR collections of  U.S. House and Senate data. 
8.  We do not distinguish between bipartisan and nonpar- 
tisan  redistricting  plans.  In  most  states,  it  is  difficult  or 
impossible  to  do so.  Some previous  analyses  also  used  a 
separate category for court-imposed plans,  but many courts 
(especially state courts) are widely known to be very partisan. 
9.  Errors in this variable, if  any, are almost certainly unre- 
lated to other variables in our analysis. 
10. We  studied the effects  of  differential  turnout  across 
districts  on  our  estimates  by  repeating  all  analyses  after 
substituting the statewide vote for the two parties (i.e., the 
total votes for the Democratic candidates cast statewide as a 
proportion  of  major  party  votes)  in  place  of  the  average 
district vote, fi.  (For a discussion of  the role of  turnout in these 
two definitions  of  statewide vote,  see Ansolabehere,  Brady, 
and Fiorina 1988.) Although the levels and patterns of  respon- 
siveness and bias  did change in some states,  the effects of 
redistricting on these quantities were not materially different 
from  those  based  on  fi.  That  is,  in  the ensuing analyses, 
Figures 1 and 2 changed in some ways, but Figures 4-7  (and 
Tables 1 and 2) changed in only substantively trivial ways. 
11.  Using average electoral responsiveness measured at fi 
between .45 and .55 (see Gelman and King 1994) gives very 
similar results when applied to the present analysis. 
12.  We  also analyzed responsiveness for these subsets of 
data and found no relevant changes. 
13. To maintain comparability, each point on the figure is 
averaged over only those 17 states that are in our data set for 
all 20  years. 
14.  Subtracting the mean from the dependent variable does 
not affect any substantive results, but it allows the coefficients 
of  redistricting to be interpreted as effects for the average case. 
15. The  specific codes  we  use  to represent  the dummy 
variables make interpretation convenient but are not other- 
wise required or consequential. 
16.  To  improve  the  estimation,  we  use  weighted  least 
squares with the estimated standard error of  each observation 
(our estimated value for responsiveness), pooled within each 
state, to compute the weight. This is a standard procedure in 
general  and  in  this  literature  (see  King  1991;  King  and 
Browning 1987). 
17.  The random-effects model altered the regression results 
in  three ways:  (1) most  of  the  standard  errors  decreased 
slightly, (2) the estimated state effects decreased,  and (3) the 
estimated coefficients of  the lagged  variables increased. All 
these changes could be considered as improvements in the 
model fit, and all are consistent with the theory of  random- 
effects models. However,  we used the simpler linear regres- 
sion model,  because  the estimated causal effects of  interest 
did not change materially. 
18. Another way to interpret equation 1 is by noting that 
the effect of  R,, (redistricting) on Y,,  (responsiveness or bias) is 
(PI  +  /3zY,,t-l),  or,  equivalently,  the  effect  of  Y,,,_,  (last 
election's responsiveness or bias) on Yit is (p, + pzR,,). 
19.  Equation  1 is a form of  an AR(1) time  series model. 
Conditional  on the first lag,  which  is estimated,  the model 
implies a geometric decline in the coefficients for subsequent 
lags.  To  evaluate  this  assumption,  we  estimated  separate 
regressions with lags 1, 2,  3,  and 4 of  redistricting,  omitting 
cases with intervening redistrictings.  In all  cases, we could 
not reject the assumption that the correlations followed the 
AR(1) pattern. For example, the theoretical and estimated lag 
coefficients for responsiveness are as follows: 
Lags  Theoretical  Estimated (s.e.) 
They decline as expected,  consistent with  the theoretical 
values based  on the lag 1 coefficient of  .40.  (Note that  the 
estimated coefficients at lags 3 and 4 are smaller than their 
standard errors.) Analysis of  partisan bias gave similar results. 
20.  In the vast majority of  states five elections, at most, are 
held under any redistricting plan. Since the estimated differ- 
ence between the effects of  bipartisan and partisan plans on 
responsiveness  is  small,  we  omit  an analogous figures  for 
partisan plans; it looks very similar to Figure 5. 
21.  Another way to look at this is with descriptive statistics: 
the average  absolute value of  bias in years following redis- 
tricting was .016,  compared to an average absolute value of 
,028 in nonredistricting years. 
22.  The biggest example of  this-indeed,  the largest effect 
of  redistricting  ever noted in the academic literature to our 
knowledge-is  the Ohio State Legislature in 1972. See Figure 
2 and the more detailed analyses in Gelman and King 1990. 
23.  We find no evidence of  a difference between the aver- American Political Science Review  Vol.  88. No. 3 
age  absolute  size  of  an  effect  created  by  Democratic  and 
Republican mapmakers. 
24.  We find little evidence that redistricting plans typically 
have an effect by selective placement of  nonvoters. 
25.  In addition,  as noted,  the causal inference for bias is 
especially reliable because lagged bias, unlike lagged seats and 
votes, does not correlate strongly with the type of  redistricting. 
26.  The Supreme Court wrote in Voinovich v. Quilter (1993): 
Time  and again we have  emphasized that "reapportion- 
ment is primarily the duty and responsibility of  the State 
through  its  legislature  or  other  body,  rather  than  of  a 
federal  court."  Growe  v.  Emison,  507  U.S.  (1993), supra, 
(quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.  1, 27 [1975]). Accord, 
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,414 (1977) ("We have repeat- 
edly emphasized that 'legislative  reapportionment is  pri- 
marily a matter for legislative consideration and determina- 
tion' " [quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (196411.) 
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